A second qualification is that the focus is only on imagining that is embedded in writing. There are many activities that may rightly be classed as forms of imagining, and there are many aspects to the power of imagination. Consider at least: conjecturing, surmising, associating, fancying, pretending, wishing, daydreaming, hoping, and so on. There is no reason to deny that each of these is a form of imagining, and there is good reason to accept that each of these is in some way neighbor to and sometimes figures in literary imagining. Wishing, pretending, hoping, and all the rest may often figure within the imagining that issues in literary achievement. But the focus here will be only on literary imagining and what is distinctive about it, in contrast with these other modes of imagining, however much it may also draw on them.
1.
It is not immediately obvious why human beings do or should spend so much time imagining things in words and paying attention to such imaginings, let alone why there are or should be serious university curricula devoted to such activities. However natural, widespread, and pleasurable engaging in such activities is, it can nonetheless remain deeply puzzling why and how producing and reading imaginative literature is a serious business, comparable in importance to law or medicine or physics, for example. Just what is the point of spilling all those words about a melancholy prince, a deluded would-be knight-errant, or a field of daffodils? Why do or should readers pay attention to such musings in words, especially if paying attention is hard work, compared with acquiring such other pleasures as may be available?
In thinking about the productive use of imagination in literary writing, it will be useful to begin with three qualifications to this essay's main title: what writers do. The first qualification is obvious enough: not all writers. Writers do many things; in fact, they write many things, from novels to recipes to journalism to lab reports to lyric poems. Here the focus will be only on literary writing: writing that attempts in a distinctive way -yet to be explicated -to absorb its audiences in its work and its medium-specific forms of attention to life. Further, the boundaries between literary writing and other forms of writing are neither firm nor clear. Some history writing displays strong powers of literary attention and imagination, thus drawing us into its imaginative work. Many strong literary works are interesting and successful in other ways besides the literary: for example, as commodities, as evidence about psychological and social-political preoccupations current in their circumstances of writing, and so on. There is good reason to accept that there are many fruitful ways to study works of literature other than as exemplars of imaginative literary achievement. So this is the first qualification: literary writing alone, where we are drawn by the work into sustained imagining, will be in view, where the imaginative dimension of literary writing is but one dimension among many even of it.
To bring together these three qualifications: not all writing, but only distinctly successful literary writing; not all imagining, but only literary imagining; and not inner process, but rather public product, will be the foci of the argument. In what public mode or manner do distinctly successful literary writers embody their imaginings in their literary products? More aptly, what are imaginative literary writers trying to do, what are the marks within the work of their successes in this effort, and why are these successes important, for them and for us? 2.
R. G. Collingwood offers a useful starting point for thinking about the importance of artistic imagining in life, in his account of art as a means for overcoming corrupt consciousness. Collingwood famously, if somewhat hyperbolically, argues that corrupt consciousness is »the true radix malorum« (Collingwood 1938, 285) , the origin of every kind of evil. Corruption of consciousness consists, according to Collingwood, not simply in a discrete mental or physical state: »it is not a doing nothing; [rather] it is a misdoing something; it is an activity, but blundering or frustrated activity« (ibid., 282). What one might somewhat misleadingly call the internal and the external dimensions of this blundering activity are not separable from one another. One is doing something. Perhaps one is working on a poem or painting, perhaps preparing a meal, or perhaps fulfilling the requirements of a salaried job: for Collingwood the activities of art and life are thoroughly interwoven with one another in both motivation and effect; the crucial issues are whether these activities are engaged in well or badly and honestly or dishonestly.
Modern life, Collingwood further argues, is conducted under particular institutions that make it increasingly difficult to undertake activities honestly. Work is done for a wage, often in difficult conditions with little scope for either creative intelligence or a share in the determination of aims. A wage is taken home, with luck to a family as a place of refuge, where it is spent on necessities and on amusements to numb the pain of exerting one's energies according to workplace commands that are frequently opaque. And yet one pretends, to oneself and to others, that one is doing what one likes or wants to do. The result is a way of life in which we, its participants, are unable to believe yet are also all but unable to admit our lack of belief, as if we were zombies.
Successful artistic activity is, according to Collingwood, a principal therapy for this condition. »The remedy is the poem itself« (ibid., 336). Both the poet in writing and the audience in reading confront and work through their distortions of feeling, finding both fuller meaning and modes of more honest attention, feeling, and activity through generating or following the densely materially embodied plot arc of the poem or other work of art. (All works of art are generated and experienced temporally.) Successful artistic writing in particular involves the transformation of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 shared burdens of suppressed, inchoate feelings that make daily activity for many less wholehearted and animated than it might be into feelings that are acknowledged and clarified through the development of the subject matter in and through the working of words into vehicles of conscious, plotted attention and feeling (see Eldridge 2008, esp. Chs. 1, 4) .
3.
Though his remarks about modern life may be somewhat hyperbolic, Collingwood's claims about the powers of art are attractive, and the problems of human life toward which these powers may be directed are real enough, even if they are not our only problems and even if these problems can also be faced in other ways. It remains, however, somewhat obscure in Collingwood's work exactly how imagining things in words embodies a response to problems of human life. In particular, how, exactly, does poetic figuration by working with words bind together feeling and attention to subject matter imaginatively, in a way that is productive for life?
Happily, responding to this question is precisely what occupies Hegel in his theoretical writings on modern literature. Beyond Collingwood, Hegel -a major source for Collingwood's own thinking -focuses carefully on poetic figuration as an imaginative device for the clarification of feeling about a subject matter, with particular attention to modern lyric poetry, where we might reasonably expect to find poetic figuration most clearly at the center of the productive work of art in relation to life. Poesie is Hegel's portmanteau term for all literary making and its products. Lyric poetry in contrast with epic is the primary form of Poesie in modern society, according to Hegel. While this claim surely scants the importance of the modern novel as well, now, of movies, the deeper point is that lyric poetry foregrounds imaginative powers -powers of Poesie -that are exercised in the making of all art. »Das eigentliche Element poetischer Darstellung [ist] die poetische Vorstellung und geistige Veranschaulichung selber, und indem dies Element allen Kunstformen gemeinschaftlich ist, so zieht sich auch die Poesie durch alle hindurch und entwickelt sich selbstständig in ihnen« (Hegel 1971, 149) .
Here, then, to begin with, is Hegel's general suggestion about the role in life of both artistic imagination in general and poetic figuration in particular. Poetry has, Hegel writes, »einen hçheren Beruf: die Aufgabe nämlich, den Geist nicht von der Empfindung, sondern in derselben zu befreien« (Hegel 1971b, 201) . This passage already says both a) that feeling is or can be a source of oppressiveness, something that blocks getting on with life effectively or wholeheartedly, and b) that feeling is not to be transcended or escaped from, but rather more effectively and aptly integrated into life. What this explanation says is that feelings can occur as dull happenstances that simply lie upon or within the heart. They are, we might say, simply suffered or undergone, and this suffering can be experienced as dullness and lack of activity and agency. By then purifying the feeling of any accidental mood -of any subjective and variable momentary source within the human subject rather than within the situation that has provoked the feeling -the subject may come actively to take responsibility for this feeling as appropriate to its object, of which object the subject has now, through attention, formed a clearer idea. As a result we as subjects can henceforth dwell with or accept such clarified feelings. We can live in or with them as more clearly appropriate to their objects, and thus we can move out of a duller suffering of experience and into more actively and self-consciously felt engagement with experience and its objects. Or, as Hegel puts it, (Hegel 1971, 77, 44, 47) Art presents objects, scenes, and incidents as though we can, fully, live with them, with our own feelings and attentions appropriately modulated to their objects and with their objects, in turn, modulated to our feelings and attentions. Through art we become better able to dwell with and in our world and our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings in relation to it.
Crucial to this work of the liberation of things from being transitory causes of happenstantial, emptily felt reactions and into things on which we may dwell with clearer and apter feeling is the work of imagination in presenting things figuratively rather than abstractly. It is especially clear in poetry that the central work is done via imaginative figuration, precisely because the imagination works here with words, which may present anything, rather than with concrete materials, such as stone or paint, where there are specific limits to what can be presented. There cannot be a statue that is depictively of a thought, nor a painting that is depictively of a mood. Though these things may be suggested, they cannot be directly presented. In con- trast, poetry is »die allgemeine Kunst, welche jeden Inhalt, der nur überhaupt in die Phantasie einzugehen imstande ist, in jeder Form gestalten und aussprechen kann, da ihr eigentliches Material die Phantasie selber bleibt, diese allgemeine Grundlage aller besonderen Kunstformen und einzelnen Künste« (Hegel 1971b, 17) . Imaginatively, we can enter into a person's thoughts, moods, and feelings, as well as into the specific look or memory of an object or incident for a subject. What, then, might be the special point of entering imaginatively into how objects, scenes, and incidents are experienced, thought about, felt, and remembered by a subject, from a point of view?
Like all art, poetry does not simply present objects, scenes, and incidents just as they are in nature or as they may be sorted into kinds for the sake of theoretical understanding of things and processes apart from us. Instead, things are presented as »belebt, erscheinend, beseelt« (ibid., 25), as though their significance spoke to us in feeling from within them. »Die Empfindung macht sich zum Mittelpunkte, beglänzt ihre reiche Umgebung, zieht sie an sich, verwendet sie geistreich und witzig zu ihrem Schmuck, belebt sie und genießt sich in diesem Herüber und Hinüber, diesem Einarbeiten und sich Ergehen ihrer in ihrem Darstellen« (ibid., 64).
In contrast, then, with scientific or philosophical presentation, artistic imagination presents things for the sake of absorbed attention and feeling, where we dwell all at once in the presentation itself, the subject matter presented, and the development of feeling in relation to both text and subject matter. »Der poetische Ausdruck gibt uns aber mehr [als das bloße abstrakte Verstehen], da er dem Verstehen auch noch eine Anschauung von dem verstandenen Objekte hinzufügt oder vielmehr das bloße abstrakte Verstehen entfernt und die reale Bestimmtheit an die Stelle setzt« (ibid., 62), the object now is presented determinately as an object of significance for attention and feeling. Figuration works further »um das Ohr zur Aufmerksamkeit zu nçtigen« (ibid., 86), so that aural attention to the text is fused with attention to the thought and its object, all in relation to feeling. »Die poetische Anschauung [hält] die innere Vernunft der Sache und deren ¾ußerung und Dasein [zusammen]« (ibid., 27). It is a form of imaginative attention that embodies and sustains possibilities of life and feeling in and with things. »Erreicht [die Poesie ihr] Ziel, so erlçst sie sich […] von jener Trennung des Denkens, das aufs Allgemeine geht, und der Anschauung und Empfindung, welche das einzelne auffassen« (ibid., 66), so that we may »mit Vorliebe aufhalten« (ibid., 62), or at any rate dwell with apt feeling and sense of significance on what is presented, however horrible or entrancing it may otherwise be. We are brought by the figurative work of poetic imagination to dwell in both thought and feeling in and with the significance of things.
Along with Hegel, a number of recent philosophers have called particular attention to the ability of careful description to afford us access to a point of view that includes thoughts, memories, and feelings about things. Thus Martha Nussbaum, citing and commenting on Henry James, notes that we are, when reading, »partic-ipators by a fond attention« (Nussbaum 1990, 43) (whether that of the author or the characters) about what is going on. Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, and Susan Feagin have developed sophisticated pretense-theories, according to which when reading we make-believe that we are seeing or hearing along with other subjects and thence further thinking, remembering, and feeling with them. As Walton puts it, fictional literary descriptions function as »props in games of make believe« (Walton 1990, 70) . Or in Currie's terms, »make-believe allows us to achieve in imagination what we are denied in reality, [so that] we gain vicarious experience through make-believe« (Currie 1990, 19) . Feagin has similarly traced how »a psychological simulation effected through making shifts« (Feagin 1996, 13) into another subject's point of view can enable both sympathetic and empathetic engagement with the affective responses of others, where the details of these engagements may be both invited and controlled by a literary text.
What Hegel, however, adds to these general claims about imaginative access to the thoughts, memories, and feelings of others is an emphasis that is less epistemicjust knowing what things are like for another -than it is oriented toward the clarification of one's own emotions. The aims of art are other than those of simply knowing. »Wir entfliehen, so scheint es, bei dem Hervorbringen wie beim Anschauen ihrer Gebilde [der Kunst] jeder Fessel der Regel und des Geregelten; vor der Strenge des Gesetzmäßigen und der finsteren Innerlichkeit des Gedankens suchen wir Beruhigung und Belebung in den Gestalten der Kunst, gegen das Schattenreich der Idee heitere, kräftige Wirklichkeit« (Hegel 1971, 42) . To seek reassurance [Beruhigung] and animation [Belebung] , and to seek them together in relation to a bright and vigorous reality, with the sense of things now unshadowed, is not simply to seek to know how it is with others; it is further to seek to come to think and feel, and to know oneself to think and feel, as it is appropriate for anyone to think and feel in relation to the materials of a common life. This explains why we are primarily engaged imaginatively with what happens to Lear or Elizabeth Bennet or Franz Biberkopf and only secondarily with imagining ourselves to be them. We want to know the sense of their situation, character, and actions in relation to our feelings. It may sometimes help to imagine oneself to be a literary character in order to gain some access to this. But it is indispensable to follow imaginatively the development of the overall situation, with our imaginative involvement and emotional development modulated by the author's point of view and manner of presentation. Along with Shakespeare or Jane Austen or Alfred Dçblin, we wish to know what to make of these characters and their situations and actions: how to feel about what happens to them. The author's situating of incidents within an overall narrative structure and the author's guiding of our attention and feeling through the manner of presentation are indispensably central to the modulation of our thoughts and feelings in the direction of reassurance and animation.
Moreover, while make-believe theory is right to emphasize that writing literary texts and reading them are best understood as practices that essentially involve the use of imagination, it also misdescribes what literary imagination does. As John 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 Gibson aptly notes, the thought that we are making-believe or pretending that certain things are true implies that we know that they are false, so that epistemically oriented make-believe theory at least seems to install a »picture of fiction as fodder for fantasy« (Gibson 2007, 172) , detached from life. Or if entertaining scenarios in games of make-believe gives us practice in feeling about life, because these pretend scenarios are like enough to what happens in real life, then why the indirection? Why not attend to the real thing? And in any case, sometimes a real thing, an object of actual perception, is in view in art as a focus for imaginative attention, as in some lyric poems. What is the work of imagining in attending to what is given in perception? What we want instead of talk of making-believe, and what Hegel supplies, is an account of our imaginative and emotional involvement with the sorts of things that may happen to particular people within our world, not somewhere else. Gibson's own view that by way of (sometimes) invented characters we come to see things of our world in the light of their significance for us is far closer to Hegel's stance than is make-believe theory. »In the construction of their worlds, works of literary fiction,« Gibson argues, »can bring the structure of ours into view: […] the connection lies in the shared fabric out of which both our cultural reality and fictional worlds are woven« (ibid., 183). Or, in Hegel's own terminology, the phenomena of our world are lifted by literary imagination out of entanglement in transitoriness and insignificance and into a clearer light of sense and feeling (see Hegel 1971, 47) .
4.
Hegel's claim, then, is that the work of the literary imagination is that of reassurance and animation, of opening routes of fuller and more aptly felt interest in life, where fullness and aptness of felt interest are threatened by general dullness, habit, inattentiveness, and the necessity of coping with the demands of material life. By imagining a situation -characters and their actions -in relation to initiating perplexities, an author explores the possible sense of things in relation to human experience and emotional involvement. By participating imaginatively in these explorations, readers, too, enter into finding the apt emotional sense of things. Ought we to believe that literary imagination has this power? And is the exercise of this power genuinely important for us? Here are several complications that must be worked through before we can answer ›yes‹ without reservation.
The first complication is that Hegel is speaking only about lyric poetry in his central passage of theorizing about freedom in feeling. He specifically treats epic poetry quite differently. Homeric epic, as Gyçrgy Lukµcs also later argued (see Lukµcs 1920), is able to present a whole form of life that is experienced as of significance. Homer typically both looks on and identifies with the central event of the shaping and reshaping of Greek culture as Greek: the Trojan war. He takes it for granted, as his audiences took it for granted, that the virtues that are displayed there 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 are the chief virtues for a form of life -Greek aristocratic-warrior life -that is itself of pre-eminent value, obviously and without argument. Epic presupposes a past world of incidents that is still recoverable and imaginatively present, a world or way of life in which there is felt assurance about central values and in which, further, there are not yet the sorts of complicated social and juridical institutions (free markets, courts, and the like) that help modern subjects to manage complex divisions of social labor. Epic is the literary form of a stable or closed culture, where there is both felt consensus about values and a lack of complex technological and social differentiation. While epic then expresses and reinforces this consensus emotionally and attitudinally, it does not have to uncover which feelings it is proper to have in relation to which things and situations. Proprieties of feeling are taken for granted. Yet even where this is so, the powers of imaginative attention to the real for the sake of emotional clarification that are foregrounded in lyric in its encounters with the perplexing are also present in epic, in its dwelling on events as having an (accepted) significance. This accounts for our sense of the existence of distinctly marked lyrical moments of figuration within epic, as in the Homeric extended simile.
In contrast with epic, the occasions and subject matters of lyric are more the plights of mind and circumstance of a now more distinctly individualized human subject. It presupposes a greater degree of social differentiation. It is a poetry of the reassurance and animation of the individual, perplexed mind, not the poetry that reminds a whole people of its values. But precisely for this reason, it foregrounds the power and value of imaginative attention as such, now directed at perplexity, a power of attention that is recognizably present in the way in which epic dwells on incidents. The element of poetic presentation is common to all the arts.
Lyric's foregrounding of engagements with perplexities, and so of the power and value of figurative imaginative attention as such, raises, however, a second worry: that lyric may be largely irrelevant to the serious business of life. Hegel sometimes criticizes (see Hegel 2008 , §140) a modern sensibility that takes its bearings primarily from lyric, rather than from actualized social institutions and from philosophical theory, for what Carl Schmitt later called its subjective occasionalism (see Schmitt 1919, 24) , that is, for flitting in interest from this to that, without ever settling into any course of life that is objectively worthwhile under modern institutions. Is lyric in modernity then the poetry of mere subjective occasionalism and so not a serious business, given that the conduct of life is now thoroughly mediated by complex actual institutions? This is a good question that it is not easy to answer. But we may be struck with the thought that, mediated by actual institutions though it may be, modern life has not in fact enabled quite so fully the stability and meaningfulness within social roles that Hegel elsewhere officially claimed for it. That is, just being a family member, a worker or owner, and a citizen within a modern democratic state is not enough to still significant perplexities of feeling. Kafka and Faulkner, among others, have taught us at least this much. The threats of dullness, inattentiveness, and the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 mere suffering of feeling persist within modernity, now accompanied by a perhaps sharper threat or sense of felt isolation, within an occupational or social or familial circle that is marked off from others by violence, rather than articulated with others in clear relations of mutual interest and support. Poetry -and specifically the lyric poetry of individual consciousness that seeks and achieves exemplariness in attention and feeling -remains a central way of responding to these threats, even if it does not point toward social-political solutions to social-political problems. If dullness, inattentiveness, and the mere suffering of feeling may also be overcome by passionate love or an exciting job or a happy family life, among other things, this is at least in part because these phenomena involve the same imaginative attention and engagement that we experience in words, through figuration in lyric. Learning to see and feel aright is something that can and must be done in life, but this learning is also perspicuously modeled for us in lyric. In short, as Hegel accepted in his Vorlesungen über die ¾sthetik, cutting somewhat against the grain of the institutional theory of the Philosophie des Rechts, even if lyric does not solve all problems, modern life nonetheless has central need of lyric, insofar as it helps us to achieve clearer and more actively maintained feelings about things, activities, persons, and phenomena of our social worlds as we experience them.
Third, one may wonder about the scope of lyric's subject matter. Many of the lyric poems that linger most in our memories have to do with moments of perplexing perception, whether disturbed or entranced. Think of Wordsworth encountering the old leech-gatherer or the drowned man, of Frost stopping by woods on a snowy evening, of Wallace Stevens at Sunday breakfast in New Haven, of Yeats among school children, and so on. Is the perceptual encounter too narrow an occasion and subject matter to take into view the full richness and range of modern life? Isn't the lyric just too particular to count or matter for more than a like-minded few? This, too, is not an easy question to answer. But there are things that can be said on behalf of lyric as a central form or mode of artistic imagining in words that appears, also, within literary forms other than the short poem. First, there are long form lyric poems -Wordsworth's Prelude is pre-eminent -that do take into view social and political occurrences as well as perceptual encounters. Second, there are novelists who allow into their writing full social and political complexities while nonetheless undertaking the centrally lyrical work of the clarification of feeling. Think of Proust or Rilke on Paris, W. G. Sebald on Milan or Vienna, or Updike on Shillington, Pennsylvania. The literary imaginative work that these writers do is the work of lyrical attention, seeking the clarification of feeling, just as Hegel describes it, but with more complex, modern objects. Perhaps there is no clarification in view of what we all feel, given that there are significant differences among modern modes of life and, therefore, feeling. But the range of attention of lyric imagining is very wide, experience is in general perplexing enough that everyone has some feelings in need of clarification, and successful lyric imaginings in various ver -1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 bal forms -the novel, autobiography, and the short story, as well as shorter lyric poems -have often enough achieved resonances with significant circles of readers.
Fourth, as already indicated in the discussion of lyric vs. epic, the idea that exercises of literary imagination in the lyrical style are important itself has material preconditions. What if technological and social life change radically? What if we destroy the planet ecologically? Or what if we come to live under pervasively authoritarian regimes of some kind, so that individuality is repressed? In those conditions, it is not clear what work there would be for poetic imagination to do. Yet while that is true enough, and technological, ecological, and political disasters there may well be, we are nonetheless arguably too much bound up with modernity and all that it entails -centrally including thinking and feeling ›for ourselves‹ from where we are -for the need for literary imagination ever quite to disappear in any readily foreseeable future. Hence poetic imagining seems likely to continue to have significant occasioning circumstances.
Finally, the clarification of feeling via poetic imagination, so that we come to live in active, felt attention to life and in liberation in feeling, is surely not the sole end that human beings have, and it is far from clear that it is a dominant end. Beyond the quasi-biological ends of food, clothing, and shelter, there are all sorts of other ends. We have an interest out of sheer curiosity in understanding how things work. We have the political end of forging and maintaining institutions that help us to negotiate difference without or with lesser violence. What is the relative importance of clarification of and liberation in feeling, relative to biological, cognitive, and political interests? Should we spend so much time reading and writing artistic literary works?
One reply to this is that while these other interests are significant, even weightier, perhaps, than the interest or end that is pursued in modern literary art, they are also not altogether independent interests. We will want to know how we do and should feel, attentively, about any developments in science, politics, and general culture that might occur as a result of the pursuit of other ends. As Wordsworth puts it, »the Poet will sleep then no more than at present« (Wordsworth 1965, 456) , whatever advances or regressions there might be in political, economic, and cognitive life. The clarification and liberation of feeling is not a dominant end, but it is not a minor, separable, and dispensable end either. So we are right to have lots of people who study and produce literary works as central occupations of their lives, and we are right to study and teach such works to wide ranges of readers who may themselves do other things in life. The work of lyric imagination has an important place within modern life in working through and clarifying feeling. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 5.
This Hegelian picture of the work of poetic imagination -pre-eminently foregrounded in lyric, but present also in other literary forms and other media of art -in relation to modern life has considerable plausibility when we focus on the experience of reading. As Rita Felski has usefully characterized that experience in her recent Uses of Literature, there is often in the experience of reading literary texts a »moment of self-intensification, […] typically triggered by a skillful rendition of the densely packed minutiae of daily life: evocative smells and sounds, familiar objects and everyday things, ordinary routines, ways of talking or passing time, a reservoir of shared references from religious rituals to popular jokes to the TV shows of a certain decade« (Felski 2008, 39) . John Updike, particularly in his Rabbit tetralogy, was a master of producing this sort of experience of self-intensification via the rendering of detail. Think of his extended close descriptions of the look of a copper beech tree, the taste of a Mr. Peanut candy bar, the development of a small town 4 th of July parade, or the feel of talking over after a golf match a news report of a goose bludgeoned to death with a putter (»a murder most fowl«). In reading, »we can be nonplussed by the clarity with which a form of life is captured« (ibid.), fully drawn into details that we recognize visually, auditorily, tactilely, or in memory. There is also what Felski calls an experience of »self-extension, of coming to see aspects of oneself in what seems distant or strange« (ibid.), as in coming to realize that »the small, unnoticed tragedies of thwarted hopes and ideals that Flaubert wrote about in Sentimental Education were all around us« (ibid., citing Mishra 2001, 250) in Benares, India, in 1989, as rendered in Pankaj Mishra's novel The Romantics. Whereas self-intensification occurs via the focusing of attention and emotion on more or less familiar details, now closely rendered, that may otherwise have drifted away from us, self-extension expands one's range of noticing and feeling to take in, attentively, aspects of a larger world.
Through the focusing of attention via close description, often involving visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory detail, one dwells in what is presented. As Felski puts it, »wrapped up in the details of a novel, a film, a painting, you feel yourself enclosed in a bubble of absorbed attention that is utterly distinct from the hit-and-miss qualities of everyday perception« (ibid., 54). This absorption is furthered by the surface qualities of the text itself, by its flow, diction, and musicality, as »fluctuating intensities of affinity and involvement are conjured out of the bare bones of intonation and modulation, ways of speaking, timbre and tonality, the tempo of style« (ibid., 63). We read, sometimes, as if possessed by the overall musicality of the development that controls the modulation of our imaginative attention (cf. ibid., 72). Susan Stewart notes that the musicality of the poetic text is neither an adornment to nor a distraction from it, but is rather essential to its way of rendering not just the situation, but also the bodily, emotional involvement of an attentive subjectivity in the situation represented. »The incantatory […] is in this sense not a mere disfig -1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 urement of a stable representation. Rather it provides the most full or ›true‹ account of […] the complexity of the human figure subject to time and suffering« (Stewart 2002, 329) 
in its involvement with what is represented.
It is for this reason, then, as Felski further argues, that »mimesis […] is an act of creative imitation, not mindless copying, a strenuous shaping, distilling, and reorganizing of texts and experiences« (Felski 2008, 85) . This point is already implicit in Aristotle's contrast between a logos or a theoretical account of a given subject matter, which presents kinds and relations among kinds that are simply externally given, and a mimesis or imitative representation, from which one learns by seeing in the representer what is represented. In an imitative representation, the subject matter is presented not simply for the sake of classification and theorizing, but rather for the sake of dwelling in the experience of the subject matter as it matters emotionally to and for an observer or reader (see Aristotle 1987, 48b, 4 and Eldridge 2001, 26 -28 for an elucidation of Aristotle's mimesis/logos terminology). Hence the traditional contrast between the mirror and the lamp (see Abrams, 1958) , between imitative-depictive literature, on the one hand, and expressive literature transmitting authors' emotions out into the world, on the other, is overdrawn. Imitative literature, as opposed to theory, is always already written from the viewpoint of feeling-saturated attention and for the sake of the working through and clarification of feeling. Aristotle urges specifically that literary diction should be not ›ev-eryday‹, but instead ›unfamiliar‹ while also clear, so that it may clarify and enlighten the feelings of those who receive it through their experience of its presentational power. »Lengthenings, curtailments, and alterations of names [words] make no small contribution towards making the diction clear and not everyday. These will produce what is not everyday, because of their variation from what is standard, as they are contrary to the norm, but clarity will come from what they have in common with the norm« (Aristotle, 1987, 58a-b, 31) .
This emphasis on emotionally clarificatory ›seeing‹ or entering into the experience of the subject matter via the experience of the representer is nicely captured in a remark of Wittgenstein's about imaginative seeing-as and experiencing the meaning of words. »Und je nach der Erdichtung, mit der ich es [ein beliebiges Schriftzeichen] umgebe, kann ich es in verschiedenen Aspekten sehen. Und hier besteht enge Verwandtschaft mit dem ›Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes‹« (Wittgenstein 1960, 521 -522) . That is, an arbitrary cipher might be seen as a shovel, perhaps, when looked at from one angle and surrounded by a certain story about what is going on, while from another angle, surrounded by another story, it might be seen as a goblet, or from yet another as an electric circuit diagram. But what follows from this is that the surrounding makes a difference for experiencing the meaning of an imitative representation that is meant to be ›felt and seen‹ imaginatively. As Kirk Pillow usefully puts it, »the [overall] fiction's terms direct our imagining« (Pillow 2009, 360) . We are, for example, guided by what we are otherwise told about Rabbit Angstrom to see his relishing the taste of peanut brittle and honey on his tongue 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 as symptomatic or typical of his overall sensualism. Or we are invited to see Jim's abandonment of the derelict Patna and its crew as the product of an overactive imagination, nourished on a diet of excessive adventure stories, that pulls him away from ordinary duty. »Seeing-as alters what we see by investing what is seen with fresh meanings. […] That is, imaginative seeing is a seeing of the object via an interpretive layer of imagery, rather than merely an imaging in the mind apart from what we see before us« (ibid., 355). The context supplied by an overall narrative and the details that are closely focused on reinforce and develop each other, guiding the full imaginative experience of the subject, all for the sake of clarifying in feeling the significance of what is being presented.
6.
Not only are ideas of recognizably Hegelian provenance represented in some recent stretches of theorizing about the powers and interest of literature, they are also presented figuratively in some important poetry that itself dwells on the powers, strangeness, and interest of literary art. While no single poem in all its details can stand in for the work that imaginative literature at its best does, it can nonetheless be helpful to see in a single exemplary case just how the clarification and liberation of feeling through imaginative attention are carried out. Other cases can then be read, if we are so inclined, as lying neighbor to a central case, as they carry out the work of imagination in similar but different ways that will have to be traced. One might, that is, see the analysis of an exemplary case as providing a set of philosophically guided notes on the work of imagination that point to further possibilities of tracing that work in other cases, both similar in overall aim and strategy, but also different in subject matter and the detailed execution of artistic strategy.
Here, then, is one case: Rainer Maria Rilke's ›Der Panther‹. ›Der Panther‹ is one of Rilke's 1907 Neue Gedichte, Volume 1, largely composed of Thing-poems or Dinggedichte, in which captivation by an object of vision that provokes intense feeling is foregrounded. This poem in particular dwells on an extended experience of seeing a perplexing, disturbing object -a panther pacing in a cage -in order to uncover the source of that object's power to compel attention, solicit reflection, and demand the clarification of feeling. This dwelling occurs despite the fact that a speaking lyric ›I‹ is all but absent, being implied only as the source of the comparisons »Ihm ist, als ob« and »wie«. Vision is here almost completely absorbed in its object, with feelings and reflective thoughts as muted effects of this absorption. Through the comparisons, however, it then emerges that the source in the object of the viewer-poet's responsive feeling is a felt affinity in the possession of blocked power, fitfully expressed, an affinity that in turn allegorizes the situation of poetic imagination in modernity. His vision, from the constantly passing bars, has grown so weary that it cannot hold anything else. It seems to him there are a thousand bars; and behind the bars, no world.
Der weiche Gang geschmeidig starker Schritte, der sich im allerkleinsten Kreise dreht, ist wie ein Tanz von Kraft um eine Mitte, in der betäubt ein großer Wille steht.
As he paces in cramped circles, over and over, the movement of his powerful soft strides is like a ritual dance around a center in which a mighty will stands paralyzed.
Nur manchmal schiebt der Vorhang der Pupille sich lautlos auf -. Dann geht ein Bild hinein, geht durch der Glieder angespannte Stilleund hçrt im Herzen auf zu sein.
Only at times, the curtain of the pupils lifts, quietly -. An image enters in, rushes down through the tensed, arrested muscles, plunges into the heart and is gone. (Rilke 1989, 25 ) (Rilke 1989, 26) The poem opens with an image of repetition (repetitive pacing) leading to lack of interest. Nothing any longer holds or fills the gaze of the panther, as he is driven by circumstance always to move but really to see nothing. Already this description intimates a comparison to constrained, non-self-directed human motion along modern urban streets and in the routines of daily life. This pacing without really seeing is, further, a loss or betrayal of possibilities of both seeing and expressively meaningful action. In the second stanza, the strong, lithe paces and gait of the panther and the panther's powerful body are condensed, as both move around a center (»um eine Mitte«), benumbed, without bringing will to expression. Both the gait and pacing and the impressive body intimate possibilities of power that are held without being actualized. The gaze of the poet-speaker is arrested by the blocked, confined power of the panther's body and pacing. This blocking of expression of will, inwardness, power, personality, and erotic intensity in body, outer surface, and gesture, together with intimations of possibilities of overcoming such blocking, is a master theme of the Dinggedichte as a whole (see Eldridge 2008, Ch. 5) . Something in us -some inwardness of personality and possibility of power -ought to come to full or fuller expression, but is failing to do so. The available circles or circuits of activity are somehow too small and too routinized for that. But sometimes, momentarily at least, something can happen. Just as the pupil of the panther's eye can momentarily widen, as though to take in, momentarily, something -one would have to look closely in order to see this -so we can stop or be stopped, in such a way that we really look: perhaps as we are stopped by and look at this panther. Then an image, centrally an image of possibilities of genuinely expressive life and movement, can enter in, move through the body and be felt there, until 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 it enters into the heart, where it dies out. Something, at least, will then have happened, however momentarily and fitfully. A moment of remembrance of the possible and of felt loss of power will have been experienced, and a moment of imaginative vision will have been achieved: sometimes an image can enter in.
This image of a moment of remembrance of inwardness and power and their possibilities, however currently blocked, as that moment is experienced -first by the panther, and second by the viewer, now stopped and concentrating on the image of the panther, really seeing it -is further an image of the act of reading itself, or of what that act can be, in certain moments of intense concentration and absorption. For it is also true that an image of power possessed, blocked, but also felt and remembered, enters into us, the readers of this poem. Like the panther in its cage, with its gait and body turning about a center, this poem, too, has a gait and material body that turn about the panther as its central image. This visual image of the pacing panther is housed within a controlled rhyme scheme (ABAB, CDCD, EFEF) and scheme of regular line length (11,10,11,10; 11,10,11,10; 11,10,11,8) . The poem opens and ends with the very same sound, the homophonic Sein/sein, creating a circular structure that models the panther's circling. Within this outer circle, Kreise/Kraft in lines 6 -7, with their percussive, initiating kr sound, further enclose the panther's dance. The will stands apart, benumbed, a line later, displaced from effective control of the still powerful movement. There is even a muted suggestion, housed in the common root in Stab-of Stäbe and Buchstaben, that we as ordinary, distracted readers are confined by letters that we pass over or pass by, inattentively, or that pass over or pass by us, as the panther passes by or is passed by the bars. Together, the rhyme scheme, line pacing, aural patterning, and semantic densities draw the reader into the imagery and development of the poem, somatically, au-A C H T U N G T R E N N U N G rally, and imaginatively. They function to arrest attention and heighten concentration on the poem, by setting up internal resonances (rhyme) and expectations of development (rhyme and line length). The shorter final line, at 8 syllables, functions both to signal that something has happened and, by breaking off, to indicate a completion, a ceasing to be and dying out of the poem and its image that matches the ceasing to be of the panther's image of its surroundings. Something has happened to us in reading the poem, as well as to the panther and viewer. Our own benumbed willing and aimless pacing have been arrested for a moment, and an image has entered in, to die in the heart.
It is not clear what we are to do with this image or as a result of reading the poem. Rilke as high modernist courts intensities of imaginative involvement rather than proposing plans for specific social or personal change. Art, poetic and otherwise, can be a thing of fleeting play or entertainment, and it is at any rate without direct, specific practical significance. But it is also far from clear that we could or should do without the kind of liberation of »jenem wahrhaften Gehalt der Erscheinungen« 1 I owe the points in these last four sentences to Hannah Eldridge, to whom I am grateful . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 from »den Schein und die Täuschung dieser schlechten, vergänglichen Welt« (Hegel 1971, 47 ) that may be brought about by intense, structured imaginative attention. Would we then be like the panther the lids of whose eyes never opened up? And who would want that?
